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'[w]here a full opportunity has been afforded to a party to the prior
action and he has failed to prove his freedom from liability or to
establish liability or culpability on the part of another, there is no
reason for permitting him to retry these issues.' 155
Clearly, claimant was not afforded the opportunity to show
that it was the State's negligence which forced his car to skid.
Moreover, the State could not be made a party to the former action
since its liability can only be determined by the court of claims,
which has exclusive jurisdiction thereof.
Collateral Estoppel: DeWitt principle held inapplicable in
fellow passenger situation.
In B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,56 the Court of Appeals, for
the first time, allowed the offensive use of collateral estoppel.
Two requirements were posited:
1. it must be unquestioned that the original action had been
vigorously defended, and;
57
2. the second cause of action must be derivative of the first.
While the Court did not explicitly, define "derivative action,"
the editors of the Survey have assumed it to encompass the owneroperator relationship.
The question left unanswered by DeWitt was whether a
passenger-driver relationship would be sufficiently derivative to
invoke collateral estoppel. An affirmative answer to this question
logically extends the offensive use of the doctrine to the train
wreck hypothetical. 58

10 19 N.Y.Zd at 146, 225 N.E.2d at 198, 278 N.Y.S2d at 600, quoting
Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 107-08, 218 N.E.2d 688, 689, 271
N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1966).
15619 NY.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
'57 For a ufrther discussion of the DeWitt holding, see The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 128, 150 (1967).
158A rain crashes with 100 passengers aboard. 50 passengers in separate
negligence actions are denied recovery. The fifty-first passenger, possibly
because he is an infant, is awarded a verdict from a sympathetic jury.
The defendant could not use the fifty adjudications of its innocence against
the remaining forty-nine plaintiffs, since they had not litigated the issue
However, a broad interpretation
of defendant's negligence themselves.
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel could allow these 49 plaintiffs to
receive sunnary judgment on the issue of defendant's negligence, based
upon the single recovery by the infant plaintiff. See 32 BRooK., L. REv.
428, 431 (1966); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. Rsv. 281 (1957).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

In Quick v. O'Connell, 59 a case criticized in a recent
Survey,160 plaintiff contended that his suit was derivative of his
fellow passenger's suit, under DeWitt, and moved for summary
judgment. The court accepted plaintiff's contention thereby giving
reality to the train wreck hypothetical.
Recently, in a case similar to Quick, Cobbs v. Thomas,'631
the rear seat passenger had recovered damages in a negligence
action. Plaintiff, the front seat passenger, moved for summary
judgment contending that her fellow passenger's recovery was
res judicata as to defendant's negligence. The court, in distinguishing this case from DeWitt, emphasized that plaintiff, here, did not
derive her right to recover from her fellow passenger.
In light of the controversy presently existing as to the interpretation of the DeWitt requirements, the Court of Appeals might
be prompted to shed additional light on them.
ARTICLE

CPLR 3403:
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CALENDAR PRACTICE; TRIAL PREFERENCES

Defendant's offer of financial assistance used to
block "destitution" preference.

CPLR 3403(a) (3) provides that a preference may be granted
in actions "in which the interests of justice will be served by
an early trial." Under this section a motion may be granted in
cases where waiting for a trial would cause an unusual hardship.1 2 Thus, for example, a preference may be granted where
64
a party is in danger of death before trial,163 or is destitute.1
In Martinkovic v. Chrysler Leasing Corp., 65 plaintiff had
medical bills outstanding of $25,000 and predicted future medical
expenses of from $12,000 to $15,000 as the result of an automobile
accident. Plaintiff claimed that she was unable to meet expenses
15953 Misc. 2d 1091, 281 N.Y.S.2d

1967).

120

(Sup. Ct. Jefferson

County

"GO
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHn's L. REv.
436, 463 (1968).
1c155 Misc. 2d 800, 286 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County
1968).
1624 WEINsTEIN, KoRx & MILLER, NEW YoRK CiVIL PRAcrICE f 3403.10
(1966).
16 3Rosenbaum v. Dornhage Realty Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 772, 254

N.Y.S.2d 78 (1st Dep't 1964) (danger of death); Dodumoff v. Lyons, 4 App.
Div. 2d 626, 168 N.Y.S2d 183 (1st Dep't 1957) (danger of death).
But see Kerry v. American Warm Air Heating Co., 32 Misc. 2d 935,
223 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct Monroe County 1961) (mere old age is
insufficient where there is no danger of death before trial).
1644 WINsTi N, KoRrT & MILmL,
Nmv YoRx Crvni PRAcTIc f3403.11
(1965).
18U 29 App. Div. 2d 636, 286 N.Y.S2d 195 (1st Dep't 1968).

